









The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 



















University of Technology, Sydney 
City campus, Haymarket 
PO Box 123 Broadway NSW 2007 
Tel: +61 2 9514 4720  
Fax: + 61 2 9514 4730 
Email: mail@chere.uts.edu.au 
www.chere.uts.edu.au  

















Health care policy evaluation: empirical analysis of the restrictions 





















1.  Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation 
Faculty of Business 






Version:  June 2005 
  










This paper investigates the nature of the utility function for health care, defined over the 
probability of survival, survival duration, health state and cost of treatment. A discrete 
choice experiment, involving treatment choice for a hypothetical health condition is used 
to test restrictions on preferences in the QALY model. We find that preferences do not 
conform to expected utility, and there are significant interactions between health state and 
survival duration. Individual characteristics are significant, implying substantial 
differences in valuations of health states across the population. The results suggest the 
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1  Introduction 
 
Economic evaluation is used increasingly by health system decision-makers to 
determine allocation of health care resources between services and levels of subsidy. 
Since 1993, legislation has required that new pharmaceuticals to be listed on the 
Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme are assessed in terms of cost-
effectiveness as well as safety and efficacy. A similar requirement has been 
introduced for new procedures and diagnostic tests to be funded on the Medicare 
Medical Benefits Schedule. In 1999 the United Kingdom government established the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence which has responsibility for developing 
guidelines for health care services for health authorities based on clinical and 
economic evaluation and for undertaking technology appraisal based on effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness. Denmark, Wales, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and the 
Canadian province of Ontario all have formal requirements for the use of economic 
evaluation in reimbursement decisions for pharmaceuticals and a number of other 
jurisdictions have some less formal arrangements for use of economic evaluation.  
 
The theoretical underpinnings of economic evaluation in health care are based in 
welfare economics. In circumstances where free markets are not expected to result in 
socially optimal allocations, cost-benefit analysis provides information about the 
welfare outcomes of different policies. In cost-benefit analysis, market and shadow 
prices are used to provide revealed preference valuations of the costs and benefits of 
alternative courses of action, with the decision rule being to fund the project from the 
set of available alternatives which has the highest net social benefit at the margin.  
In general, policy decisions must be made in the context of a budget constraint, and 
there will both gainers and losers from any policy. The value of gains and losses must 
be estimated and aggregated using some social welfare function to evaluate the social 
welfare impacts of costs and benefits of policies, most commonly using money as the 
metric. This requires information on individuals’ preferences (Slesnick 1998).  
 
Public funding decisions require assessment of resource allocation across diverse 
treatments for a range of diseases with disparate impacts. In practice economic 
evaluation in health care has focused only on health and has not used monetary 
measures of welfare impacts. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is more commonly 
used than cost-benefit analysis because of practical difficulties with finding 
acceptable monetary valuations of survival and quality of life outcomes and ethical 
concerns with using these valuations has meant that in health economics (Drummond 
et al. 1997). In CEA, outcomes are measured in terms of a uni-dimensional “natural” 
unit (cases prevented, lives saved or life-years saved). If outcomes of interventions are 
multi-dimensional the rankings arising from CEA may differ from welfare rankings.   
 
The outcomes that have been considered in health care are survival and quality of life, 
and cost-utility analysis (CUA), a more generalized form of CEA, has emerged as the 
dominant approach. In CUA survival and quality of life are combined into a single 
outcome measure, most commonly the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) (Torrance 
1986; Drummond et al. 1997). The time in a particular health state is weighted by a 
quality weight between zero (death) and one (full health) that reflects society’s  
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willingness to trade-off between quality of life and survival. QALYs are designed to 
allow comparisons across interventions with disparate outcomes, across different 
health care conditions and population groups. QALYs are treated as a cardinal 
measure of welfare impacts of health interventions, allowing ranking in terms of cost 
per additional QALY gained. 
 
The QALY approach requires an accurate description of the health outcomes 
associated with a disease state and/or intervention and a method for eliciting 
preferences for the health outcomes. A number of approaches for describing and 
eliciting preferences for health outcomes have been developed, all of which impose 
restrictive assumptions about how the attributes of health outcomes are combined, and 
how individuals trade-off between expected health outcomes and other goods.  If 
these restrictions do not hold then QALYs will not be an accurate representation of 
preferences, and the resulting resource allocation decisions may not be welfare 
improving. It is important to determine whether these restrictions can be supported 
empirically, and hence, whether QALYs provide an index of utility.  
 
The restrictions on individual utility imposed by the QALY model have been 
investigated and formally stated in a number of papers (Pliskin et al. 1980; Bleichrodt 
1995; Johannesson 1995; Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1997; Bleichrodt et al. 1997; 
Miyamoto et al. 1998; Ried 1998; Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1999), but there has been 
relatively little empirical investigation of them. Revealed preference data are 
generally not of a suitable form to allow such investigation, and the complexity of 
health care contexts makes it difficult to design experimental studies that provide for 
general investigation of the QALY assumptions.  
 
A range of approaches based on stated preference data have been used to test aspects 
of the QALY model, generally based on the use of standard gamble or time trade-off 
experiments in different populations (Bleichrodt and Johannesson 1997; Bleichrodt 
and Johannesson 1997; Bleichrodt et al. 2003; Spencer 2003). A feature of these 
experiments is that they have tended to be designed to test a specific assumption or 
subset of assumptions. 
 
Over the past decade there has been growing interest in the application of discrete 
choice experiment (DCE) methods to in health economics. DCEs allow for analysis of 
preferences for complex multi-attribute goods when limited market data are available. 
The approach is readily applicable to the multi-dimensional nature of health outcomes 
where there are impacts on different aspects of quality of life and on survival, and 
enables quantification of the individual trade-offs between the different dimensions. 
For example, Hakim and Pathak (Hakim and Pathak 1999) use a DCE to derive utility 
weights for a health related quality of life instrument (the EQ-5D instrument) and 
Gyrd-Hansen (Gyrd-Hansen 2003) uses a modification of a DCE approach to estimate 
the value of a QALY. 
 
DCEs are an alternative to methods that have previously been used to test aspects of 
the QALY model. They can provide a rich source of data to explore the underlying 
utility function for health and health care, particularly the trade-off between quality of 
life and survival. An appropriately designed DCE allows estimation of more flexible 
utility specifications, and more general tests, allowing a more general policy  
3 
evaluation framework.  In this paper we use a DCE to explore the restrictions on 
preferences for health care imposed by the QALY model. 
 
In Section 2 of the paper we provide an overview of the QALY model and its basis in 
consumer preference theory. Section 3 describes the experiment undertaken to test the 
QALY model. Section 4 describes the data collection and analysis, and in Section 5 of 
the paper we present the empirical results and discuss the implications for the use of 
cost-utility analysis for health care resource allocation. 
 
2  A model of individual health care decision making 
An individual is assumed to derive utility over her lifetime from her health state and 
from consumption of goods in each period: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) T T c h c h U U , , , , 1 1 K =                  (1) 
 
The lifetime profile of health states and consumption is uncertain. A particular illness 
or disease is associated with a probability distribution over profiles, and a treatment 
can be conceptualized as modifying this probability distribution. Individuals making 
choices about treatments face a gamble defined over health and other outcomes. A 
treatment can be characterised as a lottery over time profiles of health states and other 
consumption: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } m m m p C H p C H P ; , , ; , 1 1 1 K =               (2) 
 
where pi is the probability of experiencing the health and consumption profile: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) m i c h c h C H iT iT i i i i K K 1    , , , , , , 1 1 = =            (3) 
 
The evaluation of alternative treatments is therefore a problem of determining the 
preference ordering over different lotteries each of the form of equation (2) above, 
and the associated utilities.  For example, in choosing between treatment (TR) and no 
treatment (NT) for a particular disease, the individual will choose treatment if: 
 
( ) ( )
NT TR P U P U >                    (4) 
 
 The restrictions on preferences imposed by the QALY model have been discussed by 
a number of authors, addressing different specifications of the utility function (Pliskin 
et al. 1980; Miyamoto and Eraker 1988; Johannesson et al. 1996; Bleichrodt and 
Quiggin 1997; Bleichrodt et al. 1997; Miyamoto et al. 1998; Dolan 2000).  Bleichrodt 
and Quiggin (1999) define the conditions under which the QALY model is a valid 
index of utility defined over a profile of non-constant health states and consumption, 
as in equation (2) above.  
 
The first step in deriving the QALY model from equation (4) is to assume that 
preferences conform to Von Neumann Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility, so that  
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utility over a time profile of health states can be represented as the probability 
weighted sum of each time profile, thus: 
 
( ) i i
m
i





=                   (5) 
 
The second step is to specify that the utility function  ( ) i i C H U ,
~
  is of additive 
independent form over the one-period utility functions:  
 









                (6) 
 
Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1997; Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1999) show that, when 
expected utility is imposed, additive independence holds if the preference relation 
over lotteries of consumption and health profiles satisfies marginality.  A preference 
relation over a lottery satisfies marginality if the preference ordering depends only on 
the marginal probability distributions rather than the joint probability distribution. For 
example, suppose there are two time periods, and in each time period the health state 
can be good,  
g
t h  or bad, 
b
t h , and the consumption level can be 10 or 1. Marginality 
implies that an individual is indifferent between Lottery A, with a 0.5 probability of 
the good outcome ( ) 10 ,
g
t h   in both periods and a 0.5 probability of the bad outcome  
( ) 1 ,
b
t h  in both periods and Lottery B, with a 0.5 probability of the good outcome in the 
first period and the bad outcome in the second period, and a 0.5 probability of the bad 
outcome in the first period and the good outcome in the second period: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 5 . 0 ; 10 , , 1 , , 5 . 0 ; 1 , , 10 , 5 . 0 ; 1 , , 1 , , 5 . 0 ; 10 , , 10 ,
g b b g B b b g g A h h h h U h h h h U =
 
Marginality excludes all complementarity across time periods, such as a dislike for 
variation across time, or a preference for a lottery which avoids experiencing the bad 
outcome in both time periods.  
 
The third step is to impose the restriction that one period utility functions are 
identical, which is achieved by assuming that the preference relation over lotteries 
conforms to symmetry. Symmetry holds if, for a given profile( ) i i C H ,  the individual 
is indifferent to the time ordering of the health state-consumption combinations, that 
is, between profiles with the same health state-consumption combinations but in a 
different sequence. Symmetry cannot hold if the individual has a positive rate of time 
preference. With symmetry: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
=
= + + =
T
t
it it iT iT i i i i c h u c h u c h u C H U
1
1 1 , , ..... , ,
~
        (7) 
 
The fourth step is to impose independence between consumption and health state in 
the identical one-period utility functions. This is achieved by assuming the one-period  
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utility function satisfies standard gamble invariance. Standard gamble invariance 
holds if, for any levels of consumption c and c¢:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c h u p c h u p c h u c h u p c h u p c h u ¢ ¢ ¢ - + ¢ ¢ ³ ¢ Û ¢ ¢ - + ¢ ³ , 1 , , , 1 , ,   
 
Imposing standard gamble invariance means that if consumption is held constant, the 
preference ordering over health state-consumption combinations depends only on the 
preference ordering over health states. Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999) show that 
imposing standard gamble invariance means that  ( ) t t c h u ,  can be written as an affine 
transformation of  ) ( t h v : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t h v c z c w c h u + = ,                (8) 
 
Because the utility function is unique up to a positive linear transform, equation (8) 
can be further simplified by choosing an appropriate transformation. If h is defined 
such that at death, h is equal to zero, and  ( ) t h v   is scaled such that v(0)=0, then  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) t t
t t t t
c w
v c z c w c u
=
+ = 0 , death
              (9) 
 
The final step is to impose an assumption known as the zero condition (Bleichrodt et 
al. 1997; Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1999), which states that the individual obtains no 
more utility from additional consumption when dead. The zero condition implies that 
the utility of consumption when life duration is zero is invariant to the level of 
consumption, hence for any real non-negative levels of consumption, c¢ and c¢ ¢ , when 
the health state is death 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) t t t t
t t t t t t
t t
c w c w
v c z c w v c z c w
c u c u
¢ ¢ = ¢
¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ = ¢ + ¢
¢ ¢ = ¢
0 0
, 0 , 0
           (10) 
 
Therefore, the zero condition implies that  ( ) t t c w  is a constant, and again, employing 
the fact the utility function is unique up to a positive linear transform,  ( ) t t c w  can be 
set equal to zero. Thus, if preferences for lotteries defined over lifetime profiles of 
health care and consumption conform to the VNM expected utility axioms, 
marginality, symmetry, standard gamble invariance and the zero condition, the utility 
function for lotteries over profiles of health states and consumption can be written as 
the QALY model (Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1999): 
 
 





it i h v c z p U ∑ ∑
= =
=
1 1               (11) 
 
The function  ) ( it h v  gives the QALY weight, scaled such that v(death) is zero and 
v(full health) is unity. If these restrictions hold, the QALY weight for a particular 
health state can be assumed to be independent of time, consumption, and the profile of  
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health states or consumption already experienced. This simplifies the problem of 
valuing the outcomes of health interventions to one of identifying the set of health 
states that will occur as a result of the disease/intervention, the probabilities that they 
occur and the likely time profile of health states, and then calculating appropriate 
measures of the QALY weight, v(h) of those health states. 
 
This model does not explicitly allow for time preference. If discounting is introduced, 
the symmetry restriction must be replaced by trade-off consistency. Trade-off 
consistency holds if the individual’s strength of preference for one outcome over 
another in a given time period is invariant across time periods. Bleichrodt and 
Quiggin (1999) show that by imposing trade-off consistency in addition to 
marginality, standard gamble invariance and the zero condition, under VNM expected 
utility,  
 










              (12) 
 
This model allows the discounting factor, t λ , to vary over time, and can be further 
simplified by assuming a constant discount rate. A constant discount rate is achieved 
by imposing a stationarity condition on preferences. Stationarity means that the 
preference ordering over two different profiles of health state-consumption 
combinations that share one common outcome is unaffected by the timing of the 
common outcome. 
 
In summary , as noted by Dolan (2000), the “enhanced generalisability that comes 
from constructing an almost infinite number of profile scores (QALYs) from 
valuations of a finite number of composite states comes at a price, namely, a number 
of restrictive assumptions about individual preferences” (p.1731). Once these 
restrictions are imposed, relatively straightforward stated preference experiments can 
be used to value health outcomes. The most commonly used experiments are standard 
gamble and time trade-off experiments (Torrance 1986; Drummond et al. 1997). 
 
 
3  A discrete choice experiment to test the restrictions of the QALY model 
In DCEs, respondents are presented with a series of hypothetical choice sets, each 
with two or more alternatives, and asked to choose their preferred alternative from 
each choice set.  The alternatives in the choice set are described in terms of attributes, 
which may be generic (common across alternatives) or alternative specific (belonging 
only to particular alternatives). The alternatives may be labeled, to allow for an 
underlying preference for a particular product or brand (for example, medical 
treatment, surgical treatment), or they may be unlabelled (for example, treatment A, 
treatment B).  The attributes of the alternatives are varied over a plausible and policy 
relevant range, generally expressed as a set of discrete levels. Experimental design 
principles are used to determine the selection of the combination of levels of attributes 
for each alternative to be included in each choice set.  
 
Discrete choice analysis derives from Random Utility Theory (Thurstone 1927; 
McFadden 1973; Manski 1977) and is described elsewhere (Louviere et al. 2000; Hall  
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et al. 2002; Viney et al. 2002).  Utility is not directly observable, but can be estimated 
from observed choices. Given the choice between two alternatives j and k, the 
probability that individual i chooses alternative j is:  
 
( )
( ) ij ik ik ij
ik ij i
V V
U U j P




             (13) 
where Uij is the utility of choice j for individual i, Vij is the systematic component of 
the utility and  ij e  is the random, or unexplained, component, which may be due to 
unobserved or unobservable attributes of the choice, unobserved taste variation or 
measurement error (McFadden 1973; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The systematic 
component of utility Vij depends on attributes of the alternative, j, and on attributes of 
the individual, i, making the choice.  The model estimated depends on assumptions 
made about the distribution of the random component, and the nature of the choice 
being modelled. It is commonly assumed that the  ij e  are independently and identically 
distributed, with a Gumbel distribution, leading to a conditional logit model 






















=             (14)   
 
The scale parameterm  is inversely proportional to the variance of the random 
component. It is not possible to estimate theb ’s separately from the scale parameter, 
and it is commonly assumed that  1 = m . 
 
We develop a discrete choice experiment that allowed for observation of choices over 
lotteries that vary in terms of the probability of outcomes, defined in terms of duration 
of survival, quality of life and consumption, allowing for tests of the restrictions 
imposed by the QALY model. The experiment is a discrete choice analogue of the 
standard gamble and time trade-off tasks typically used to elicit weights for QALYs, 
with cost of treatment included as a proxy for loss of consumption. Under VNM 
expected utility, the key restrictions of the QALY model to be tested are marginality, 
symmetry and standard gamble invariance. It is also possible to test whether 
preferences for health care conform to VNM expected utility. The zero condition is 
both relatively non-controversial and not readily empirically testable.   
 
The experiment presents a series of forced choices between two labelled alternatives, 
“treatment” (TR) and “no treatment” (NT) for a set of hypothetical health conditions. 
In each choice set, respondents are endowed with a health condition and asked to 
choose between treatment and no treatment. A forced choice allows all possible 
outcomes to be specified explicitly, rather than in the case of an experiment with an 
opt-out alternative, where the perceived attributes of the opt-out alternative cannot be 
specified in the experiment and may vary across choice sets and across respondents. 
 
Each alternative in a choice set represents a lottery defined over health outcomes and 
consumption. For the treatment alternative, there is a cost to the consumer of  
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undergoing treatment, and the treatment provides a probability of returning to full 
health for a specified survival duration, and a complementary probability of death. For 
the no treatment alternative there is no cost to the consumer, but the consumer has a 
probability of remaining in the endowed health condition for a specified survival 
duration, and a complementary probability of death. Thus, the outcomes of the lottery 
are a specified chronic health state, with a variable but known duration, or death. 
 
Table 1 presents the attributes and levels used in the experiment. For the treatment 
alternative, the attributes are the probability, Ptr, that the treatment will be successful 
and return the individual to full health (for which there is a complementary probability 
that the treatment will be unsuccessful and result in death); the life expectancy, Ttr, the 
individual will experience if treatment is successful; and the cost of treatment, C. For 
the “no treatment” alternative, the attributes are the probability, Pnt, of surviving 
beyond one month with the health condition (for which there is a complementary 
probability of dying within one month)
1; the life expectancy, Tnt, for an individual 
who survives with the health condition; and the health related quality of life, H, 
associated with the condition. Thus, in the no treatment alternative the cost attribute is 
fixed at zero, and in the treatment alternative, the health state is fixed at full health. 
For reasons of plausibility, the probabilities of survival in the no treatment alternative 
vary over a larger range than in the treatment alternative.  
 
Table 2 summarises the health states used in the experiment, which are drawn from 
the EQ-5D (Dolan 1997; Hakim and Pathak 1999). The health states were selected to 
cover the range of health states represented by EQ-5D, to be ordered, and to ensure 
that the levels on each dimension are reasonable when considered together, for 
example, so that “confined to bed” is not combined with “no problems with usual 
activities”.   
 
All possible choice sets are given by the factorial combination of the attributes of both 
alternatives, which results in 4096 choice sets. For each alternative there are 64 
possible combinations of attributes. To ensure that all within-alternative interactions 
could be estimated, the experimental design incorporates the full factorial for each 
alternative. This requirement can be minimally met by combining each combination 
of attributes for the first alternative with one combination for the second alternative, 
but the choice of these combinations to construct the choice sets affects the efficiency 
of the design. Details of the experimental design and the data collection are provided 
in Viney, Savage and Louviere (Viney et al. forthcoming). 
 
4  Data and model 
A random sample of 347 respondents each completed 16 choice sets, providing 5552 
observations. Figure 1 presents plots of the marginal frequencies for each of the 
attributes, that is the proportion of respondents who chose treatment when presented 
                                                 
1 This attribute reflects the “immediate death” outcome in SG tasks for obtaining QALY weights, but 
the attribute was described in terms of dying within a month to make it more realistic, and to make it 
more equivalent to the probability of death from treatment (since it might be assumed that it could take 
up to one month between the decision to have treatment and the treatment taking place). 
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with each level of a particular attribute, with all other attributes varying. The marginal 
frequencies show the average impact of a change in the level of the attribute on the 
probability of choosing treatment. The marginal frequency plots suggest that 
respondents were most responsive to the probability of survival in each alternative 
and to the health state experienced in the no treatment alternative. There is relatively 
little difference between health states 3 and 4 in terms of the probability of choosing 
treatment, but for the two poorer health states, there is a large increase in the 
probability of choosing treatment. Respondents were least responsive to changes in 
the level of the cost attribute. Increasing the survival duration in the treatment state 
from 10 to 20 years had a large impact on the probability of choosing treatment, but 
for increases above 20 years there was a relatively small increase in the probability of 
choosing treatment.  There is a similar but smaller effect for increases in the survival 
duration in the no treatment health state.  
 
Of the 347 respondents, 46 had missing data for some socioeconomic characteristics, 
most commonly household income. These were excluded from the estimation to allow 
comparison of models with and without individual covariates. Preliminary estimation 
showed that the estimated coefficients for the experimental variables were robust to 
exclusion of these respondents. The mean age of respondents was 37.2 years 
(sd=11.45). Table 3 summarises the characteristics of the estimation sample (n=301). 
 
To test the assumptions of the QALY model, a multiplicative error term is assumed: 
 
( ) nt tr j e z C T HS P V U
ij




In log form, the probability of individual i choosing the treatment alternative is given 
by: 
 
( ) ( )
tr i nt i nt i tr i nt i tr i V V U U
, , , , , , ln ln Pr ln ln Pr e e - ³ - = ³
       (15) 
 
If the zero condition is accepted as an uncontroversial restriction on preferences, the 
general form of the utility function, with expansion up to quadratic terms, is given by: 
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    (16) 
 
The health state under the treatment alternative (full health) is constant and is 
therefore included in the treatment constant. Cost is zero for the non-treatment 
alternative. The health states for the no treatment alternative are dummy effects coded 
for estimation. This general form allows for rank dependent expected utility (Quiggin 
1993), in which probability enters via a probability weighting function g(Pj), for 
example,   
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( ) j j P P g ln ln g =                 (17)   
 
Expected utility is a special case of rank dependent expected utility function, with the 
probability weighting function equal to the probability. 
 
Under the QALY restrictions, the expected utility of an alternative is given by the 
product of probability of surviving, the survival time and the QALY weight associated 
with the health state. In log form: 
 
( ) ( ) nt tr j C HS T P U j j j j j j j , , ln ln ln = + + + + = e k j         (18) 
 
If the QALY restrictions hold the coefficients on the variables that are common to the 
treatment and no treatment alternatives (time and probability) should be equal, 
consumption should be separable, there should be no interaction effects (zero 
coefficients on the interaction terms), and the coefficients on the survival time and 
probability terms in the utility function should both be equal to one.  To test these 
restrictions, a number of nested models were estimated using logit and compared 
using likelihood ratio tests.   
 
6  Results 
In all models, an intercept is included only for the treatment alternative, indicating the 
average propensity to choose treatment over no treatment. Because the choices in the 
experiment were labelled as treatment and no treatment, a preference for treatment 
over no treatment can be interpreted either as a preference for the labelled alternative 
‘treatment’ or as a preference for full health over other poorer health states. Individual 
specific covariates are interacted with a treatment dummy, and therefore the 
coefficient on a particular covariate can be interpreted as the impact of that 
characteristic on the choice of treatment over no treatment. All covariates except the 
age and income variables are dummy effects coded. The age and income variables are 
entered in log form. 
 
Model comparisons are presented in Table 4. Table 5 presents parameter estimates for 
the main models of interest, based on the tests of restrictions, discussed below. Model 
1 is the most general specification, corresponding to equation 16. The parameters on 
probability and survival duration differ for treatment and no treatment and are freely 
estimated, and interaction terms and individual specific covariates are included.  
 
In Model 1, coefficients on the cost and cost interaction terms are not significant, and 
a test of equality of parameters indicates that the coefficients on the survival time 
under treatment and no treatment are not significantly different from each other. 
Model 2 tests the restriction that the coefficients on the cost terms are jointly equal to 
zero. The likelihood ratio tests reveal that this restriction cannot be rejected. Model 3 
further imposes the restriction that the coefficient on the survival time term is generic 
across treatment and no treatment alternatives (although it does allow for interaction 
between survival time and health state). Again, this restriction cannot be rejected. As  
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shown in Table 4, all further restrictions on parameters imposed by the QALY model 
are rejected. Thus, Model 3 represents the preferred generalised QALY model.  
 
In Model 3, the coefficient on the intercept, which captures the value of full health, is 
positive and significant, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, individuals have a preference 
for treatment over no treatment. The coefficients on covariates indicate how 
preference for treatment varies by individual characteristics. All covariates except sex 
have a significant impact on treatment indicating that individual characteristics are 
important in determining tastes for health care and health outcomes. In the standard 
QALY approach any heterogeneity in preferences for quality of life and survival is 
ignored; the average QALY weight for the population is used to value interventions.  
In this analysis, the individual’s age, own health status, education, income and wealth 
are found to be important in determining preferences for treatment. The estimated 
coefficients for the covariates are robust to different model specifications. The effect 
of age is negative and significant, suggesting that the preference for treatment 
decreases with age. The respondent’s rating of his/her own health also has a 
significant impact. Those in poor health are significantly less likely to choose 
treatment compared with those who rated their own health as fair, good or excellent. 
The effect of own health rating may reflect the fact that respondents with more 
experience of poor health states are more willing to tolerate remaining in poor health, 
or are relatively risk averse. However, those who had a chronic health condition 
displayed a preference for treatment over no treatment.  
 
The coefficient on income is positive and significant. This suggests that those on 
higher incomes have a preference for treatment over no treatment. The income term 
may also capture the impact of the individual’s budget constraint despite the cost 
attribute being insignificant. Similarly, both wealth, reflected by home ownership and 
holding private health insurance, are positively associated with a preference for 
treatment. The effect of education is not monotonic. Those whose highest completed 
level of education is secondary school and those whose highest completed level of 
education is a tertiary qualification prefer no treatment over treatment, while those for 
whom the highest completed level of education was a trade certificate or diploma 
preferred treatment. Family structure is also relevant to preferences for treatment over 
no treatment. Individuals with partners prefer no treatment and individuals with 
dependent children are less likely to choose treatment over no treatment. Individuals 
who had been hospitalized in the previous five years prefer no treatment over 
treatment. This may reflect negative experiences of hospital care, or of the outcomes 
of treatment. 
 
In Model 3, the “Generalised QALY” model, the coefficients on the probability terms 
differ for the treatment and no treatment alternatives, suggesting utility is state 
dependent. The coefficient on the probability of survival for treatment is not 
significantly different from one (95% CI: 0.67-1.23), consistent with expected utility. 
However, for no treatment, the coefficient on probability term is significantly greater 
than one, suggesting a non-expected utility model may be appropriate when 
evaluating outcomes involving poor health. The coefficient on the generic survival 
time term is less than one, suggesting a positive rate of time preference.  
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The failure to reject the restriction of zero coefficients on the cost terms in the 
genearlised QALY model provides weak support for separability of consumption, 
although the lack of significance may suggest that the cost attribute was poorly 
understood, or that the levels did not result in respondents making trade-offs. This is 
particularly the case given that covariates capturing income and wealth are significant. 
 
Model 3a differs from Model 3 in that it imposes expected utility. The likelihood ratio 
test rejects this restriction. Model 4 imposes the restriction of no interaction between 
health state and survival time. This restriction is also rejected (Model 4 vs Model 3). 
Tests of coefficient restrictions for Model 4 reject both the hypotheses that the generic 
coefficient on survival time is equal to unity and that the coefficients on the 
probability terms for the treatment and no treatment alternatives are equal. Model 5 
imposes the restriction of a generic probability coefficient across the treatment and no 
treatment alternatives, and Model 6 further imposes the restriction that this coefficient 
is equal to unity, imposing expected utility, as in the QALY model. Model 6 differs 
from the QALY model in that it allows for time preference, and allows valuations of 
health states to vary by individual characteristics. Comparisons of Models 5 and 4 and 
Models 6 and 5 reject these restrictions.   
 
Model 7 imposes all the QALY restrictions, but allows individual specific covariates. 
In Model 8, all the QALY restrictions are imposed. Comparison of Models 7 and 8 
show that including covariates significantly improves the model as was suggested by 
the significance of the individual specific covariates in all the other models. Given the 
logarithmic specification, the exponent of the treatment intercept (including the 
covariates) can be interpreted as a valuation of full health, and the exponent of each of 
the health state terms can be treated as a valuation of that health state relative to full 
health, under the constraint that the QALY restrictions are imposed. Inclusion of the 
covariates therefore changes the valuation of full health relative to poorer health 
states.  Overall the comparison of the models leads to a rejection of the restrictions 
imposed by the QALY model.  
 
Table 6 illustrates the impact of imposing the QALY restrictions in valuing outcomes 
of interventions.  It presents the relative health state valuations as calculated from the 
estimated QALY model and the generalised QALY model. Because of the experiment 
design, these health state valuations are not directly comparable with the published 
EQ-5D tariffs, as they are constrained to lie between one (full health) and zero 
(death), with no worse-than-death health states allowed, and if there is a preference 
for treatment over no treatment, the no treatment health states will be scaled to reflect 
this. It is possible however to compare the health state valuations across models. The 
QALY model weights are presented in the first column of Table 6. As the QALY 
model does not include individual covariates the estimated QALY weights do not 
vary across individuals. They are calculated as the ratio of the exponent of the 
estimated coefficient for each health state to the exponent of the constant term under 
the treatment alternative, which can be interpreted as the value of full health.  
 
Because the health state valuations in the generalised QALY model depend on 
individual characteristics, the generalised QALY weights in Table 6 are calculated for 
a particular individual (female, aged 50, annual household income of $50,000, 
reported own health as good, highest education level is secondary school, in a couple  
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with dependent children, renting, with no chronic health conditions, no private health 
insurance, has been hospitalised in the last five years). Further, because the 
generalised QALY model does not impose expected utility, allows state dependence, 
and includes interactions between health states and survival durations, the weights 
vary depending on the probabilities of survival under each alternative and on the 
survival duration.  
 
Results are presented across three probability levels: high probability of survival in 
both alternative (Ptr=Pnt=0.99); low probability of survival in both alternatives 
(Ptr=Pnt=0.5); and different probabilities of survival under each alternative (Ptr=0.99, 
Pnt=0.50). In each case, the survival duration under treatment and non-treatment are 
equal, but are varied across four levels, between 10 and 40 years. The estimated 
generalised QALY weights are calculated as the ratio of the value of each health state 
relative to full health, which now depend on probability and survival duration.     
 
For the worst health states (h1 and h2) the valuations monotonically decrease with 
duration, but for health states that are closer to full health, the valuations 
monotonically increase with duration. Comparing the high and low probability of 
survival cases, the generalised QALY weights are larger for higher survival 
probabilities. The QALY weights for the no treatment health states are reduced when 
the treatment survival probability is high relative to the no treatment survival 
probability.  This variability in health state valuations demonstrates that imposing the 
QALY model restrictions distorts valuations.  
 
 
7  Conclusions 
This paper presents analysis from a discrete choice experiment that suggests that the 
QALY model, which is the dominant model in economic evaluation of health care, 
may not be a valid representation of individual preferences for health care. In 
particular, the results show that health state valuations vary with individual 
characteristics, with probability of survival and non-monotonically across survival 
durations. The utility associated with very poor health states may decline as survival 
duration increases. This suggests that the use of the simple QALY model in health 
care resource allocation may introduce distortions. The extent of these distortions is 
largely an empirical question and will vary across interventions, particularly in terms 
of how the intervention affects probability of survival, survival duration and quality of 
life. Health care interventions involve risky outcomes for individuals, and cost-utility 
analysis fails to take account of the impact of risk on individual welfare because it 
implicitly assumes that there is no risk at the population level. Further, applying a 
simple discounting factor that does not take account of the variation in valuation of 
survival duration across health states is unlikely to reflect preferences. The empirical 
results in this paper confirm the theoretical conclusions that the QALY restrictions are 
unrealistic (Bleichrodt and Quiggin 1999). 
 
This raises the question of why cost-effectiveness has become the dominant approach 
to economic evaluation in health care. This partly relates to reluctance to place 
monetary values on health gains because this is considered ethically objectionable,  
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and partly to the perception that allocation of health care resources should be 
concerned with maximisation of health gain alone. However, the use of a cost-
effectiveness threshold as a decision making criterion explicitly monetises health gain. 
Further, as Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999)note, an implication of the QALY model is 
that the utility of a given health gain will be greater at higher levels of consumption. 
Thus, the QALY model does not avoid the ethical concern that higher income 





Table 1 : Attributes and Levels 
 


















54%  10 years  $80,000  39%  10 years  H1 
69%  20 years  $60,000  59%  20 years  H2 
84%  30 years  $40,000  79%  30 years  H3 




Table 2: Health States used in the discrete choice experiment
1 
 
  H1  H2  H3  H4  Full 
Health 
Mobility  3
  2  2  2  1 
Self Care  3  2  1  1  1 
Usual Activities  3  3  2  1  1 
Pain/Discomfort  3  2  2  2  1 
Anxiety/Depression  3  3  2  1  1 
 
1.  1 represents the best level (“no problems” or “not” for that dimension), 2 represents an 
intermediate level (“some problems” or “moderate”) and 3 represents the worst level 
(“extreme” or “unable to”).  
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Table 3: Sociodemographic characteristics: sample proportions (n=301) 
 
Male  43.5% 
Female  56.5% 
Married/defacto  61.2% 
Dependent children  45.5% 
Self reported health   
Excellent  38.9% 
Good  50.1% 
Fair  10.0% 
Poor  0.3% 
Chronic health condition  14.3% 
Hospitalisation in last 5 years  21.0% 
Highest education level   
Completed primary or secondary  38.5% 
Trade Cert/Diploma  29.6% 
Bachelor or higher degree  31.9% 
Household income   
£ $20,000  13.3% 
$20,001-30,000  12.0% 
$30,001-40,000  14.0% 
$40,001-50,000  12.3%. 
$50,001-60,000  12.0% 
$60,001-$70,000  9.0% 
$70,001-$80,000  5.7% 
$80,001-$100,000  7.3% 
>$100,000  14.6% 
Private Health Insurance (hospital)  56.1% 




Table 4: Tests of the QALY Restrictions 
 
Model  Description  Restrictions  Log 




1  General model (RDEU)    -4966.81         
2  Consumption separable (RDEU)  0 . 2 = = = T C C C b b b   -4967.39  LR:2 vs 1  1.16  8.81 (3)  Accept 
3  Generic survival time (RDEU)  T Tnt Ttr b b b = =   -4968.01  LR:3 vs 2  1.24  3.84 (1)  Accept 
3a  Generic survival time (EU) 
1 = = Pnt Ptr b b  
T Tnt Ttr b b b = =  
-4975.79  LR:3a vs 3  15.56  5.99 (2)  Reject 
LR:4 vs 3  11.08  8.82 (3)  Reject 
1 = T b   207.77  3.84 (1)  Reject  4  No time-health state interaction (RDEU)  0 . =
j HS T b   -4973.55 
Pnt Ptr b b =   6.09  3.84 (1)  Reject 
LR: 5 vs 4  6.10  3.84 (1)  Reject 
5  Generic Probability coefficient (RDEU)  P Pnt Ptr b b b = =   -4976.60 
1 = P b   8.83  3.84 (1)  Reject 
LR: 6 vs 5  8.92  5.99 (2)  Reject 
6  QALYs with time preference and 
covariates (EU) 
1 = = Pnt Ptr b b  
0 . =
j HS T b  
-4981.06 
LR: 6 vs 3a  10.54  7.81 (3)  Reject 
7  QALYs with covariates (EU)  1 = = T P b b   -5084.34  LR: 7 vs 6  206.56  3.84 (1)  Reject 
8  QALYs (EU)  z z " = 0 b   -5434.59  LR: 8 vs 7  700.50  25.00 (15)  Reject 
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EU Generalised QALYs 
Model 6 
QALYs : Time Pref and Cov 
Model 8 
QALYs 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>z  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>z  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>z  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>z 
Intercept  3.886  1.046  0.000  2.058  0.749  0.006  2.037  0.749  0.007  1.351  0.045  0.000 
Lnptr  0.955  0.141  0.000  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Lnpnt  1.389  0.100  0.000  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
lntime  0.350  0.044  0.000  0.347  0.044  0.000  0.361  0.044  0.000  -  -  - 
hsfx1  0.102  0.381  0.790  0.089  0.378  0.814  -0.754  0.063  0.000  -0.715  0.062  0.000 
hsfx2  0.225  0.363  0.535  0.220  0.359  0.540  -0.184  0.058  0.001  -0.178  0.057  0.002 
hsfx3  -0.049  0.344  0.887  -0.053  0.340  0.877  0.385  0.055  0.000  0.357  0.054  0.000 
lntimehs1  -0.280  0.121  0.020  -0.271  0.120  0.024  -  -  -  -  -  - 
lntimehs2  -0.133  0.115  0.247  -0.129  0.114  0.254  -  -  -  -  -  - 
lntimehs3  0.141  0.109  0.194  0.139  0.108  0.195  -  -  -  -  -  - 
tr_ovh_p  -2.086  0.599  0.000  -2.059  0.595  0.001  -2.070  0.596  0.001  -  -  - 
tr_ovh_f  0.577  0.226  0.011  0.579  0.224  0.010  0.581  0.224  0.010  -  -  - 
tr_ovh_g  0.988  0.212  0.000  0.970  0.210  0.000  0.972  0.211  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_lnage  -1.941  0.182  0.000  -1.924  0.181  0.000  -1.917  0.181  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_sexfx  0.047  0.048  0.320  0.047  0.047  0.321  0.046  0.047  0.326  -  -  - 
tr_lninc  1.427  0.089  0.000  1.412  0.088  0.000  1.411  0.088  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_ed_sc  -0.167  0.066  0.011  -0.164  0.065  0.012  -0.164  0.065  0.012  -  -  - 
tr_ed_tdip  0.380  0.068  0.000  0.377  0.068  0.000  0.377  0.068  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_couplfx  -0.220  0.060  0.000  -0.215  0.060  0.000  -0.215  0.060  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_depkid  -0.269  0.051  0.000  -0.267  0.050  0.000  -0.267  0.050  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_ownbuy  0.396  0.061  0.000  0.393  0.061  0.000  0.391  0.061  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_phi  0.295  0.052  0.000  0.292  0.052  0.000  0.291  0.052  0.000  -  -  - 
tr_chron  0.184  0.072  0.010  0.185  0.072  0.010  0.185  0.072  0.010  -  -  - 
tr_hosp  -0.137  0.058  0.018  -0.140  0.058  0.015  -0.140  0.058  0.016  -  -  - 
Log L  4968.01  -4975.7877                           -4981.0601   -5434.5858           
Pseudo R













    Ptr=Pnt=0.99  Ptr=Pnt=0.50  Ptr=0.99; Pnt=0.50 
    T=10  T=20  T=30  T=40  T=10  T=20  T=30  T=40  T=10  T=20  T=30  T=40 
h1  0.127  0.183  0.151  0.134  0.124  0.136  0.112  0.100  0.092  0.071  0.058  0.052  0.048 
h2  0.217  0.291  0.265  0.251  0.242  0.216  0.197  0.187  0.180  0.113  0.103  0.097  0.094 
h3  0.370  0.416  0.458  0.485  0.506  0.309  0.341  0.361  0.376  0.161  0.177  0.188  0.196 




Figure 1: Plots of Marginal Frequencies 
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